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Decision at Strasbourg: Ike's Strategic Mistake to Halt the Sixth Army Group at the Rhine in 1944 (Ausa) | 
 enlarge | Author: David P. Colley
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Buy New: $23.07
New (28) Used (7) from $21.92
Media: Hardcover
Pages: 320
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.2
Dimensions (in): 9.1 x 6 x 1.1
ISBN: 1591141338
Dewey Decimal Number: 940.542439
EAN: 9781591141334
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| Editorial Reviews:
Product Description
In late November 1944, just a day before Lt. Gen. Jacob Devers Sixth Army Group was to launch a bold attack across the Rhine into Germany, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower ordered a halt to the operation. Such an unexpected opportunity to cross the river, seal off the German 19th Army, and maneuver behind the German 1st Army fighting Gen. George Patton might have ended the war six months early. Until now, few have ever heard about this lost opportunity, and historians have never fully explained why Eisenhower stopped Devers, nor have they analyzed the possible outcome of such an attack. This book does just that, exploring what might have occurred had Ike allowed Devers to cross the river.Colley judiciously cites the opinions of many high-ranking generals, including Patton, that the attack would have been a bold and likely successful maneuver that could have saved thousands of lives. In rolling out this alternative historical perspective, the author offers insights about Eisenhower that illuminate the potential consequences of his cautious leadership and his rejection of a man he disliked and whose strategy he lacked confidence in. Colley points to Ike's reliance on old friends, sometimes regardless of ability, and argues that the conduct of World War II in Europe was often determined by personal amities and animosities. It is the only book to be written about the aborted action and how politics and personalities intervened to deny an opportunity to shorten the war. Its premise is certain to engage all interested in World War II and its lessons. Published in cooperation with the Association of the United States Army.
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| Customer Reviews:
 a thought-provoking book on a decision that could have changed the course of WWII January 16, 2009
J. Rudy (Fairfax, VA)
4 out of 4 found this review helpful
In "Decision at Strasbourg" David Colley examines the denied opportunity for one of the allies less famous generals, Lt Gen Jacob Devers. Colley proposes that General Eisenhower directly ordered Lt Gen Devers Sixth Army Group to not cross the Rhine in November 1944, a full four months before the famed Ludendorff Bridge was captured in the small German town of Remagen. During a meeting during one of the rare General Eisenhower visits to the front lines, he realized the massive preparations the Sixth Army Group had undertaken in preparation for the first major combat incursion across the Rhine. Colley asserts that an adversarial relationship between Eisenhower and Devers strongly influenced the order to remain on the west side of the Rhine.
After landing in the French Riviera during Operation Anvil, Lt Gen Devers drove the Sixth Army Group through southern France and and up the Rhone Valley until they linked up with the Allied invasion forces who landed on the famous beaches of Normandy. Colley documents the accomplishments of the Sixth Army Group against the German 19th Army as they clashed through the Rhone river valley and the Vosges Mountains. Once clear of this final geographic barrier, elements of French General LeClerc's 2nd Armored Division liberated the symbolic city of Strasbourg fully surprising the German defenders at the proximity of Allied Forces.
Following the liberation of Strasbourg, the General Devers ordered combat patrols across the Rhine to determine the strength and composition of the forces facing them. These patrols reported back empty pillboxes on the Siegfried line. With the German 1st Army facing the Normandy invasion forces; the 19th Army in a salient around the city of Colmar; and the last defensive band in Germany undefended, the gates to Germany were wide open. A bold strike into Germany in late 1944 could have dramatically changed the course of the war in Europe. Devers, aware of this possibility, begin the planning process for the first push into Germany.
Colley postulates that it was an adversarial relationship between Eisenhower and Devers that caused Ike to issue the order prohibiting the cross river attack. In the book, he examines the interpersonal dynamics among the Allied generals. Ike and some of the others were classmates at West Point, but Colley asserts that Devers was perceived as an outsider by this select group of officers. Colley speculates Eisenhower intentionally denied this opportunity in order to keep the honor of the first across the Rhine for one of the members of this close-knit group of generals.
Colley lays out many applicable factors such as the overall strategy laid out for the liberation of Europe and he examines the possible influences this may have had on Eisenhower's decision to hold back Devers. Colley also reviews Eisenhower as more of a "Coordinator in Chief" vice "Commander in Chief" of the Allied forces. Coalitions only work if all the players agree on the rules and the objectives. Colley speculates that the international politics may also have influenced the decision.
So what would have happened if Allied forces had crossed the Rhine in September 1944? Colley examines this too. His expert analysis of the potential realignment of German forces to meet this threat.
Drawing on personal diaries of the Generals and of confidants (a.k.a. Kay Summersby) Colley was able to accurately portray the interpersonal dynamics that influenced Eisenhower's decision. With the addition of intelligence reports of both combat and Wehrmacht general officer prisoner debriefs, he credibly paints a picture of the potential impact of the decision.
This book would be a perfect for the World War II history enthusiast.
 Excellent Presentation Of 6th Army Group From Southern France To The Rhine October 7, 2008
David M. Dougherty (Arkansas)
21 out of 21 found this review helpful
This book's main theme is that the Seventh Army under Patch was the first to cross the Rhine in November, 1994, and that Eisenhower stopped the full crossing because he didn't like the 6th Army Group commander, Jake Devers. It is extremely well-researched so that the book's main point is not in contention, and one is left to digest the situation, Ike's decision, the reasons therefor, and the consequences. Also included is another missed opportunity, when Gerow's 5th Corps (of Hodges's 1st Army) broke through the West Wall in the Schnee Eifel near Wallendorf on September 14th, 1944, an event that could have taken Hodges to the Rhine but was also stopped.
General Devers is developed as the primary protaganist in this work which is focused on his 6th Army Group. This force has been largely ignored by historians since Devers courted absolutely no publicity, and left Montgomery, Patton, Bradley and Eisenhower to dominate headlines. Nonetheless, as the author clearly points out, 6th Army Group could have provided the decisive breakthrough that might have saved many tens of thousands of lives and ended the war months before it actually ended.
What happened is that Devers pushed 7th Army up on his northern flank through Strasbourg, defeating the German 19th Army in November, 1944, and suddenly found itself on the banks of the upper Rhine. Devers pushed across patrols which found the German bunkers on the east bank of the Rhine deserted. The Germans had not yet occupied their Rhine defenses, and in the event, did not do so for a number of days. Devers quickly put together a plan to put 7th Army across the Rhine, but Eisenhower, who was visiting Haislip's 15th Corps (of 7th Army) heard about the attack and halted it. Accompanied by Bradley, (interesting, since Bradley was an Army Group commander of 12th Army Group and therefore had no business in the 6th Army Group area) Eisenhower went to Devers's headquarters and called off the entire movement in a stormy session and re-directed Seventh Army to support Bradley.
So why, and what could have been? The author makes the case that Eisenhower favored those on his team, and Devers was an outsider who had been placed in Ike's theater by Marshall. Ike had already made the commitment to a "broad front" strategy, and for Montgomery to be first across the Rhine in the North. He was totally unwilling to change his strategy or allow an outsider to grab the glory due to an unexpected opportunity. That's the summary, but of course, the author provides many more details, much background, and fleshes out the entire situation. In the event, the Bridge at Remagen changed things five months later, and even Patton got across the Rhine before Montgomery who would not move until he possessed overwhelming force.
This is a valuable book in that it describes the campaign of 6th Army Group and questions the "broad front" strategy without becoming bogged down with Montgomery's insubordination and coalition-breaking actions. Eisenhower's safe strategy was one of attrition, costing a maximum of American lives, but also reducing the chances for error and possible defeat by the Germans. Montgomery had performed poorly in Normandy, depending on superior American firepower to break the Germans, then the chase across France was conducted to minimize risk, and finally Montgomery's poorly planned operation Market-Garden in Holland turned out to be a disaster. From that point forward, Eisenhower was taking no chances -- he would grind down the Germans and win in a walk. The dash of 7th Army to the Rhine, the breakthrough by Gerow, and the German attack in the Ardennes proved how faulty the "broad front" strategy was. Had Montgomery been less arrogant perhaps the strategy might have been changed, but Montgomery by his own actions doomed the strategy he favored and did the Allies a horrible disservice.
So how could/would the situation have played out had the 7th Army crossed the Rhine in November, 1944, five months before the Rhine was crossed in actuality? Devers planned to have 7th Army turn north and take the German forces facing Patton in the rear. That would have drawn the German armies massing for the Ardennes attack to turn about, re-cross the Rhine and attack 7th Army head-on. 7th Army would probably have been in dire straits unless reinforced, and although possible, it is unlikely that Eisenhower would have forced his prima donnas to the North to rush to Devers's aid. More likely the 7th would have been forced back across the Rhine, but at a minimum, there would have been no Battle of the Bulge and Montgomery and Bradley would have faced less resistance moving forward to the Rhine. It is difficult to see how the war would not have been concluded earlier than it actually was due to the collapse in German morale that could be expected (and actually did happen) by the Americans crossing the last significant natural obstacle in the West -- the Rhine.
Al in all, this is a significant book, and well worthy of purchase and reading. I only gave it four stars due to its rather short length (212 pages), fairly light development in some areas (Operation Northwind, for example), and discussions and analyses that I believe could have been more thorough. I was left wanting more, and felt that the book, although it hit its mark, also left a lot on the table for further reading.
Other books the reader might consider concerning 7th Army would be:
"America's Forgotten Army" by Charles Whiting (the 7th Army);
"When The Odds Were Even", by Keith Bonn;
"The Final Crisis Combat in Northern Alsace" by Eichard Engler; and
"Seven Days In January" by Wolf Zoepf (Operation Northwind).
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